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IN THE SUPRDIE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RTCHAIWG. FOOTE, SHIRLEY
P. FOOTE, and VENICE THEATRE
COIU'ORAT I ON,
Plainti fls and
Hespondent,

vs.

Case No. 16533

NEWTON A. TAYLOR,
De f <•ndan t and
Appellant.

-------·------BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEHENT OF FACTS
On August 7, 1978,
Foote (Foote), agreed

t

respond~nts,

Richard G. Foote and Shirley P.

ll and appellant Newton A. Taylor (Taylor)

agreed to buy the restaurant and theatre equipment located in the Venice
Pizza Hut and Venice Theatre.

This action concerns sale and lease of

businesses located in Nephi, Otah, generally known as the Venice Theatre
and the Venice House of Pizza.

The real estate in which the businesses

opPrat<' is owned by the Venice Theatre Corporation, a Utah Corporation,
and the business equipment is owned by Richard G. Foote and Shirley P.
Foote.

The corporation and these individuals had listed this property

for sale with Woodriver Realty, of Provo, Utah in the Spring of 1978.
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The defendant Newton A. Taylor was employed as a salesman by l<oodriver
Realty and became acquainted with the property in such capacity.

The

dt•tails of tl1is agrPenJent were set out in an Earnest Money l!cceipt and

Offer to Purchase which was signed by both Foote and Taylor.
price for the equipment was $40,000.

The purchase

This amount was payable as follows:

$1,000 down at the signing of the agreement, $5500 on or before October 15,
1978, $3500 on or before February 15, 1979.

TI1e remaining $30,000 was

to be amortized over 15 years at 9 per cent interest.
monthi~

The resulting

payments were to be $304.29 with the initial payment due on

August 15, 1978.

This agreement in pertinent part stated that the down

pay111cnt of "$1000 is non-refundable if buyer is unable to perform on
contract."

Four days later,

Venice Theatre Corpore1t ion grantPd the defendant

Taylor a lease with an option to purchase.

This lee1se and option concerned

the real estate where the restaurant and theatre were located.

The required

monthly lease payment was $240 payable on the fifteenth day of each month.
The lessee was allowed a credit of $35 per month due to the fact that the
lessor was receiving that amount from another tenant 1n the building.
Among other things, the lease stated, "In case of failure to faithfully
perform the terms and covenants herein set forth, the defaulting party
shall pay all costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees resulting
from the enforcement of this agreement or any right arising out of its
breach."

-2-
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At the time the lease was entered into, the roof over part of
the restaurant area was in need of repair.
responsibility for the cost of such repair.

Respondent verbally acknowledged
Appellant, a contractor, was

given the option of performing the work himself and deducting the cost
thereof from the lease payment or obtaining a bid elsewhere.

(T. at 74 and 76)

Deciding that he w;~s too busy to fix the roof himself, appell;~nt n·ceived
an estimate from a qualified roofer.

However, this estimate was never

submitted to respondent.
By October 15, the parties were deadlocked over the issue of the
roof:

appellant refused to make either lease or purchase payments until the

roof was repaired, and respondent refused to make repairs until he received
the payments or assurance that they would be made if the repairs were
completed.

Communication deteriorated until the parties sought legal advice.

In a telephone conversation on October 18, respondent's attorney was
informed by appellant's attorney that the $5500 payment was in his trust
fund and would be paid upon the completion of the roof repair. (T. at 16 and 146)
Relying on this information, respondent contracted for the roof to be
fixed.

Work on the roof commenced the week of October 24th and was completed

on Saturday, October 28th - the date of a Halloween extravaganza at the
theatre sponsored by appellant.

(T. at 100)

Without notice, appellant

vacated the premises on or after October 31, 1978.

In addition, appellant

had not given the $5500 to his attorney and this sum was never paid to
respondent.
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During the term of his occupancy, appellant made two lease payments.
No payment was ever made on the equipment.

Throughout the period appellant

operated the theatre and made a profit from that activity.

(T. at 91)

Immediately after taking possession of the restaurant, appellant began
extensive remodeling of the kitchen area.
wall were removed.

All of the sinks and a pl3stcr

All electrical equipment including grills, heating

elements, and water heaters had been disconnected.
were left intact.
to the Nephi dump.

Only the pizza ovens

Cupboards only six years old had been rcmovpd 3nd carted
At no time did respondent give appellant permission

to remodel or dispose u[ items within the restaurant.

Upon re-('ntry,

respondent found the kitchen which had been operational at the time the
lease·was signed to be nearly dismantled.

(T. at 23 and 61-62)

The cost

to restore the kitchen to working order was estimated to be at least
$1500.

(T. at 27)
\~ilea

changed.

16, 1978.

tenant, appellant caused the locks of the building to be

The only keys were not given to respondent until after December
(T. at 82)

Without access to the building, respondent was unable

to properly winterize the premises.
pipes froze and broke.

During a cold spell, some of the

The cost to repair this damage was over $900.

Neither the keys nor the premises were ever voluntarily surrendered
to respondent.

Only by obtaining a court order on December 6, 1978, was

respondent able to re-enter and retake control of the property.

Upon

re-taking the building, respondent sought to rPlet the premises so as to
mitigate further damage.
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,

orl'

November 2, 1978, respondent filed suit for damages in

Fourth J udicial District Court and prayed for judgment tn the amount
1
I

of $6,348.58 plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.

Appellant

countcr-'c laimed.

i'

'r,
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After hearing the case, the Honorable David Sam, District Judge,
found tl.:•l appellant had br<'achcd the purchase contract anti the- lL'aS<'
agre-ement.

That there was no merger of the agreements.

The Court

found that respondent had suffered damages in the amount of $2,052.16
due t<> the loss of fair rental of the bui !ding and equipment; judged
that r• .pondent be allowed to retain as equitable compensation for
damagv to the pizza parlor, $1000, and awarded $1150 as reasonable
1

attornf"/, B

fees.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE LEASE AND PURCHASE
AGREEMENTS DID NOT MERGE, SINCE THERE WAS NO UNITY AS TO
SUBJECT, TIME AND PARTIES.

Although appellant maintains as his first point that the Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase and the Lease Agreement were not
separate agreements, but rather merged into one contract, this conclusion is
incorrect.

Appellant relies on Harty v. Hoerner as support for his contention.
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The holding of that case in its entirety is:
"Hhere different writings relating to the same

st~bject

are

executed at the same tjme between the same' parties, a

fundamental principle of construction requires they be
treated as one and the same

'

Lnstrument.,.

170 Colo. 506, 463 P.2d 313,314 (1969).

1

In other words, in order to effect a merger of writings, there must be

a sameness of:

!)subject, 2) time, 3) parties.

In this case the

purchase agreement differs from the lease agreement in these significant
and controlling points:

a) there arc two separate parties, i .c.

Venice Theatre Corporation as to the lease agreement; Richard G. Foote
and Shirley P. Foote as to the purchase agreement;

b) they were not

executed at the same time, i.e. the lease August 11, 1978, the purchase
agreement August 7, 1978;

c) the two writings concerned different subjects,

i.e. the lease, real property and the purchase agrec•ment, person,llty;
d) no unity in time of performance, i.e. the purchase agreement was to
extend over a period of fifteen years while the lease would expire in three;
e) no unity in consideration.
This situation 1s clearly distinguishable from the facts in Harty.
In that case, plaintiff loaned $5000 to a company of which defendant was
president.

A promissory note and a subordination agreement were signed

simultaneously.

The company defaulted on the note and plaintiff sought to

hold defendant personally liable.

The subordination agreement expressly

stated that defendant was only signing in his capacity as president and
that thf' compnny was principally liable.

11H• court held that thvrt• was

-()- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a merger since both the note and the subordination agreement clearly

concerned the same subject - the loan of the $5000.

The subordination

ugrcemcnt \V.:ls held necessary to explain the relationship of the parties.

In Reid v. Johnson, a California Court was faced with a situation
n•markably simiL.Jr to the cast~ at hancl.

111rce documt•nts, two concerning

tilt' ll'a:;l·r of rl'al propc•rty and one concerning the sail' of personal

property to be used in conjunction with the realty, were executed on or
about the same day.

It was appellant's contention that the various

writings should be read as one contract.

The Court, however, stated:

"It is therefore the general rule that two or more separately
executed ,instruments may be considered and construed as one
contract only when upon their face they deal "ith the same
subject matter and are by reference to one another so connected
that they may be fairly said to be interdependent."
85 Cal. App. 2d 112,116, 192 P.2d 106, 108 (1948).
Upon examination of the agreements, the court found that the contracts
did not make reference to the subject matter of each other.

It stated:

"Whether we take them together or separately, it is difficult
to see how they can be construed together as one contract, when
each appears to be a separate, independent agreement."
85 Cal. App. 2d 112, 116, 192 P.2d 106, 109.
Likewise 1n the present case, the lease makes no reference to the
subject matter of the equipment purchase or vice versa.

They are not

interdependent; each is a separate independent contract.
A definition of merger may be helpful at this point.

Construing

contempor.1nPous instruments together simply means that if there are any
provisions in one instrument limiting, explaining, or otherwise affecting

-7-
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the provisions of another, they will be given effect.

This does not

mean that the provisions of one instrument are imported bodily into
another, contrary to the intent of the parties; they may be intended
to be separate instruments and to provide for entirely different things.
See Sterling Colorado Agency, Inc., v. Sterling Insurance Company,
266 F.2d 472,476(10th Cir. 1959).

Moreover, the court in Sterling stated:

"Considering sevt•r:ll instruments as one is not tlu..• n3tural
construction, and 1s resorted to only to effcctuat(~ thl'

intention.

11

266 F .2d at 476.
In the present case, there has been no showing that the provisions
1n one instrument were intended to explain or limit the provisions of
the other.

The instruments were prepared by the appellant, who, through

acting for himself, was also acting for Woodriver Realty.

Consequently,

they should be considered independent agreements.

POINT II.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE JUDGMENT OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES.

It should first be noted if the judgment of the lower court that
there werP two separate agreements is affirmed, this argument is
superfluous.

Since a liquidated damages clause is contained only 1n

the equipment purchase agreement, it could not be used to limit respondent's
recovery on the lease agreement.
Moreover, it should also be noted that in his judgment, the
trial judge stated in respect to the down payment, "Judgment allowing the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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plaintiff to retain as equitable compensation for damage to the Pizza
parlor, $1000 down payment made on the purchase thereof."
mntlt' no mc•ntion of tlH! money as

] iquidated datn<lgcs.

The judge

R.athcr the money

was to go to pay for damages which accrued to the restaurant kitchen as
a result of appellant's unauthorized remodeling.

Appellant testified he vacated the premises on October 31, 1978.
(T. at 109)

Respondent's complaint was filed November 2, !978.

Surely

the mcrP p~ssugc of one day between breach and filing cannot b~ seen as
uncquivocable election on the part of the respondent to retain the down
payment as his remedy.

Rather it would seem that 1n immediately filing

suit, respondent had elected to seek damages in a court of law.
judge noted this fact at trial.
with this proposition.

(T. at 103)

The

Case law is in harmony

In Walden v. Backus, the court ruled that it did

not have to even consider the question of liquidated damages since

'~y

filing this action the sellers elected to seek actual damage clause of
the agreement."

81 Nev. 634,408 P.2d 712,714 (1965).

In any event, if this particular money is taken to constitute
·,J liqui-clc~ted damages, it should be noted that liquidated damages only

compensate for injury due to breach of contract.

A liquidated damages

clause should not limit respondent's claims sounding in tort.
It cannot seriously be contended that respondent failed to prove
any actual damage to the restaurant as a result of appellant's actions.
On the contrary, respondent presented uncontroverted testimony that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
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1' ..

appellant had turned an operational restaurant into shambles.
and 61-62)
hnd started.

(T. at 23

Appellant himself admitted he failed to complete the work he

(T. at 124-125)

At trial, respondent presented an estimate of the cost to repair
the kitchl•n.

Appellant objected to the introduction of that cvidencl'

and attorney for respondent laid additional foundation for the evidence.
There was no further objection.

Appellant should not be allowed now to

complain of its introduction.
Moreover, appellant has consistently maintained that the $1000
award is liquidated damagl's.

llowever, it is precisely in situations

where damages are speculative, indefinite, or uncertain, that an award
of stipulated damages is appropriate.

The Colorado Supreme Court stated:

"One of the essential elements to the enforcement of a contract
for retention of a sum paid as liquidated damages 1s that the
damages to be anticipated are uncertain in amount or difficult to
be proved."
Grooms v. Rice, 163 Colo. 234, 429 P.2d 298, 300 (1967).
The uncertainty of actual damages occasioned by a breach of contract is
immaterial.

Rather, the amount of liquidated damages is presumed to

be the amount of damage, King v. Oakley, 434 P.2d 868 (Okla. 1967)
unless disproportionate to any possible loss that might have been
contemplated, so that to enforce it would shock the conscience of the
Court.

Tennent v. Leary, 82 Ariz. 67, 308 P.2d 693 (1957).
The lease agreement which was signed by appellant stated that

the defaulting party would pay reasonable attorney's fees resulting from
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the enforcement of any right ar1s1ng out of a breach of the agreement.
Appellant does not contend that the amount of the fee is unreasonable or
that respondent did not breach the agreement.

Rather he maintains that

there was no necessity for incurring them and respondent was not
justified 1n his demands.

Interestingly enough, in appellant's

counter-claim he also prayed for an award of reasonable attorney's fees.
(T. at 145)
The rule in most jurisdictions is that a provision in a contract
for attorney's fees in event of breach is valid.
this rule early on.

Utah has adhered to

See McCurnick v. Swem, 36 Utah 6, 102 !'. 626(1909).

Such a provision is regarded as a reasonable provision for reimbursement
or indemnity to the creditor against the expenses incident to a default
on the part of the debtor.

Some cases base the rule on the conceded right

of parties to make their contracts in whatever form they please, provided
they conform to the law of the land.

See McClain v. Continental Supply Co.,

66 Okla. 225, 168 P. 815 (1917).
TI1is view was affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in TI1atcher v.
Industrial Commission where it stated, the judiciary "has the power to
determine what is reasonable when the law or the contract of the parties
provides for a reasonable fee."

115 Utah 568, 575, 207 P.2d 181 0949).
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CONCLUSION
lkcause2 the plaintiffs did establish the2 cxistcnc<' of two agreements,
breach thereof by appellant, and because the evidence was sufficient to
establish the damage sustained as result of the breach, respondent asks
that the judgment of the Court below be affirmed.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent was mailed first-class, postage prepaid to:
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